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Patents have the potential to constrain professionals in the exer-
cise of autonomous responsibility in their practices. Furthermore,
the ability of a profession to serve the public good may also be
affected by patenting, which could alter the willingness of profes-
sionals to disseminate and put into practice new learning.'
Recently, patentable subject matter has become a much-debated and liti-
gated issue. Judges and commentators have tried to define reasonable limita-
tions for patentable subject matter without obstructing innovation in the
Information Age.2 In retrospect, the patentable subject matter criteria articu-
lated in State Street in 1998-that the invention produce a "useful, concrete,
and tangible result,"-now seem like the zenith of the scope of patentable
subject matter.3 In recent Supreme Court decisions, a trend towards invalidat-
ing business method software patents is increasingly evident.4 It seems clear
that the scope of patentable subject matter has swung back in the direction of
increasing limitations, but there is little agreement on the boundaries.5 In this
paper we propose a defense for professionals whose practices are partially
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1. John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV.
1139, 1176 (1999).
2. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (J. Kennedy and J. Stevens refer-
ring to the "Information Age" as the successor to the Industrial Age); see also
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that statutory pat-
entable subject matter "include[s] anything under the sun made by man").
Courts have been trying to escape from this phrase for the past 30 years.
3. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (to be patentable, an invention must produce a "useful, tangi-
ble, and concrete result.").
4. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 657.
5. See id. at 656.
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claimed in some of the business method patents issued by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO). Delineating professional practices as ineligible
to be patentable subject matter can be viewed as another battle in the "war"
against "crony capitalism," which can be defined as a tendency that makes
use of the narrowest forms of self-interest at the expense of societal welfare.
Making professional practices ineligible as patentable subject matter does not
extirpate crony capitalism, but it is a change that is likely to yield societal
gains to the extent that professions are legitimate.6
I. INTRODUCTION
In Part I, we discuss crony capitalism in general terms. In Part II, we
discuss early patent law, which was enacted in the wake of the Statute of
Monopolies in 1625 as a reaction against crony capitalism.7 Crony capitalism
takes place when private interests are able to obtain economic benefits from
the government in the form of protection from competition that enable these
private interests to achieve above normal (monopoly) profits at the expense
of societal welfare.8 With crony capitalism the checks and balances provided
by largely unregulated (free) markets are not present and thus inefficient
practices are allowed to persist, with the government providing a shield from
competition. Certainly wrongly issued patents fall into this category, which
award patentees protection from any other party that "makes, uses, or sells" a
patented process. 9 We contend that the same forces that led to passage of the
Statute of Monopolies in England migrated across the Atlantic and were at
the heart of many constitutional disputes, state and federal, before and after
the American Revolution. We show that between 1790, when the first U.S.
Patent Act was enacted and the present, various forms of crony capitalism
continued to reemerge.
In Part III, we explore the precursors and foundations of business
method patents (BMPs), which were rejected for the first 210 years of the
Republic. In doing so, we come to the conclusion that business method pat-
6. We are not arguing that crony capitalism has not been manifest in the actions of
some licensed professions, but simply that licensed professions provide some
protections that guard against the worst abuses of business method patents.
7. Steven Calabresi & Larissa Price, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History
of Crony Capitalism (Nw. L. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Series, Working Pa-
per No. 214, 2012).
8. Id. at 42; see generally FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990) (describing
a basic principle of economics that monopolies are bad from two perspectives:
First, monopolies transfer more revenue from consumers to producers than in
freely competitive markets. Second, there are deadweight losses which are con-
sumer losses not gleaned by producers or sellers.).
9. See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 8 (describing patentable subject matter to
include machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter). In this article we
are focusing on patentable processes or business method patents.
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ents are often inefficient; in other words, they are granted in situations in
which the patent is highly unlikely to enhance public welfare.o Many of
these BMPs claim various transactions and processes that overlap and inter-
fere with professionals in their practices. In fact, a number of patent applica-
tions are analyzed in order to demonstrate the encroachment of BMPs into
accounting and other professions.
In Part IV we examine the implications of cordoning off professions
from patentable subject matter through a "learned profession" defense and
conclude that any process that overlaps standard practices of professions
should not qualify as a patentable process because there is no expansion of
the public domain. In this section we explore the unique features of practic-
ing a profession and how these features provide some protection against
crony capitalism, though we are mindful that professional licensing could
also be abused to raise prices at the expense of the public without corre-
sponding social welfare benefits. We provide a Conclusion in Part V.
II. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF PATENT LAW
A. Early Patent Law, the Statute of Monopolies and Crony
Capitalism
Flaws in modern day business method patents are analogous in many
ways to the inefficiencies caused by the profligate issuance of monopolies by
English monarchs, which led to enactment of the Statute of Monopolies by
Parliament in 1625.11 We view these royally issued monopolies as a form of
crony capitalism, which were often used to shield friends of the king and
other powerful members of the ruling class in Parliament from legitimate
competition.12 Crony capitalism takes place when monopolies (patents) are
obtained by friends of the government in high places who do not offset the
harm to societal welfare (in the form of higher prices and trade restrictions)
by expanding the public domain through inventions.13 Early on (in the Eliza-
bethan Era) it was recognized that, "English monarchs frequently used pat-
ents to reward favorites with privileges, such as monopolies over trade that
increased retail prices of commodities."14 The basic concept of public choice
10. We are using the term "public welfare" consistently with its use by economists
in textbooks and academic articles. A policy enhances public welfare if the sum
of consumer and producer surplus increases. For an explanation of the caveats
added to the assumptions used when discussing "public welfare," see id. at 18.
11. See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 9.
12. See id.; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962)
(viewed by many economists as the seminal work on crony capitalism).
13. See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 9.
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economics is that the government's ability to grant monopolies or erect barri-
ers to entry generally benefits a single business or group at the expense of the
welfare of the general public.15 Issuing patents could be justified, however, if
the grantee of the monopoly enlarged the public domain through invention of
"new and useful" technology that was not obvious.16
It could be argued that crony capitalism began in the feudal age before
capitalism was the dominant form of economic activity. There is evidence of
royal granting of monopolies as early as the 1300s, but by the time the Stat-
ute of Monopolies was enacted by the English Parliament in 1625, the unfor-
tunate consequences of crony capitalism were apparent to most important
social thinkers, as well as the general population.l7 In addition to raising
prices and retarding innovation, royally issued monopolies were responsible
for impeding entrepreneurs in their business plans and hindering skilled
workers from finding employment.18 The difficulties of enforcing monopo-
lies were also apparent. According to Adam Smith, who wrote The Wealth of
Nations in 1776:
Like the Laws of Draco, these laws [granting monopolies] may be
said to be all written in blood . . . the exporter of sheep, lamps, or
rams, was for the first offence to forfeit all of his goods for ever,
to suffer a year's imprisonment, and then to have his left hand cut
off in a market town upon a market day, to be there nailed up; and
for the second offense to be adjudged a felon, and to suffer death
accordingly. 19
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, English monarchs were in a
rivalry with Parliament over control of government, but Parliament had ex-
clusive power to enact taxes and fees.20 Although Parliament was in control
of taxes, before 1625 it could not control the granting of monopolies by En-
glish monarchs, who then charged fees for continuance of the monopolies. In
a number of instances, patents/monopolies were issued by English monarchs
15. See generally BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 12. There is a huge array of
law and economics literature that discusses the process and impact of special
interest favors. Pursuing the favors that government can dole out is often called
"rent seeking." Regardless of how it is labeled, the basic concept is that, in
general, relative to free competition, monopoly shrinks the size of the public
domain unless other factors exist such as negative externalities.
16. Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § I (Eng.).
17. See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 8.
18. See id. at 9.
19. See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 8, at 9 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH
OF NATIONs (1st ed. 1776)).
20. See id. at 16.
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and later rescinded if the patentee did not pay fees tq the monarch with
alacrity.21
The negative consequences of monopoly were apparent to most observ-
ers in the early seventeenth century, and the basics of modern day patent law
were born in this struggle for power. 22 Although control over the issuance of
patents could be viewed as a simple rivalry between royalty and Parliament,
modem patent law emerged from the Statute of Monopolies.23 The main pro-
vision of the Statute of Monopolies outlawed the issuance of monopolies by
monarchs and transferred that authority to Parliament.24 Queen Elizabeth, in
particular, was a notorious abuser of the system, issuing patents for such
common commodities as salt and starch.25
Enacted in 1625, the Statute of Monopolies took away the authority of
monarchs to issue monopolies, which significantly harmed their access to
revenue. 26 In relation to patent law, however, Section Six of the Statute of
Monopolies is the most noteworthy section. Section Six of the Statute of
Monopolies allowed Parliament to issue Monopolies for up to fourteen years
if the beneficiary was "the true and first inventor."27 In effect to mitigate the
harm associated with monopolies, a quid pro quo emerged in that the patent/
monopoly was limited in time, but the monopolist had to invent something
new, useful, and non-obvious.28 The net effect was that to obtain a monopoly,
the beneficiary had to expand the public domain by inventing something new
and useful, and the monopoly was time-limited.
The passage of the Statute of Monopolies, however, did not extirpate
crony capitalism. In spite of the 1625 Statute, Parliamentary control of pat-
ents was still contested by English monarchs who were addicted to the reve-
nue that issuing monopolies could generate. 29 A number of historians and
commentators have linked battles between Parliament and the monarchy to
the issuance of monopolies that occurred after 1625, resulting in two civil
wars. 30 In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith contended that when govern-
21. See id. at 9.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Statute of Monopolies, supra note 16, at § 6.
25. See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 8.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Statute of Monopolies, supra note 16, at § 6.
28. Id.
29. Calabresi, supra note 7, at 21.
30. See generally Statute of Monopolies, supra note 16.
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ment officials sat down to lunch with business interests, the cost of the lunch
and much, much more was paid for by the public.31
It is also important to note that besides directly issuing monopolies,
other manifestations of crony capitalism took place in a variety of forms to
shield wealthy supporters from competition. Two of the most apparent forms
are tariffs, used to reduce foreign competition while raising revenue, and
license requirements to practice various occupations and professions.32 While
some requirements for licenses to practice various professions have been
based on well-founded rationales, such as ensuring professional competence
and ensuring public health and safety, others have not. 33 We view crony capi-
talism as a tendency that can surface in a variety of forms, but the basic
ingredients are that the government shields private interests from competition
without receiving an expansion of the public domain in return, such as new
and useful inventions.34
B. Crony Capitalism Crosses the Atlantic: A Known and Feared
Danger
An important, but largely unappreciated, economic fact of life among
the colonists in the territories that later became the United States, is the re-
curring battle between idealistic leaders and crony capitalists in both England
and the Colonies.35 Indeed, the American Revolution could be said to have
been inspired by the refusal of Colonial leaders to recognize monopolies is-
sued by Parliament that allegedly applied to the Colonies.36 A prime example
is the Boston Tea Party, which was inspired by a revolt against the East India
Company's trade monopoly. Until shortly before the Revolution began, many
of the colonists viewed themselves as Englishmen, and as such, entitled to
freedom from monopolies, which were outlawed in England in 1625.37 On
both sides of the Atlantic, debates emerged as to whether Colonists were
entitled to the rights of Englishmen and whether the breadth of the Statute of
Monopolies extended to England's colonies.38
31. SMITH, supra note 19, at 249; see also Adam Gopnik, Market Man, THE NEW
YORKER, Oct. 18, 2010, at 82.
32. Calabresi, supra note 7, at 21.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. at 22.
36. Id. at 5. "The American colonists shared English concerns about exclusive mo-
nopoly privileges issued by the government, which imposed enormous costs on
the general public and especially consumers."
37. Statute of Monopolies, supra note 16, at § 1.
38. Around the time of the Revolution, there was an expectation that Colonists had
the benefit of English statutes, but, "In practice, English Statutes generally had
256 [Vol. XIX
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Fear and loathing of monopolies eventually led to the American Revolu-
tion, though there were certainly other causes. 39 Before the Revolution, inde-
pendent of the Statute of Monopolies, there was anti-monopoly language and
protection in a number of the Colonial charters that appeared to prevent their
governments from granting monopolies.40 Failure to protect colonists from
royally granted monopolies such as the East India Company, led to resistance
and Tea Party revolts. Certainly among the Colonial intellectual elite, and in
England at the time, the evils of government-granted monopolies were well
known as a clear and present danger.41 The imposition of these monopolies
on the Colonies brought short-term windfalls to the monarchy but ultimately
led to revolts that ended up severing the relationship between the United
States and England. Again, the basic principle of crony capitalism is that
granting a monopoly without getting something in return, such as an expan-
sion of the public domain due to an invention, harms society more than it
benefits special interest friends of the government. Another feature of crony
capitalism is that as time goes on, its inefficiencies become more and more
apparent, leading to complaints, protests and revolts.
C. Patents, Monopolies, and Continued Resistance to Crony
Capitalism
Following the success of the American Revolution, each state drew up a
constitution and the states had to agree on a federal Constitution. The Consti-
tution acted as a governing document that regulated the states. In a number of
states, bitter memories and experience with government granted monopolies
were still vivid and thus at the time of the enactment of the U.S. Constitution
in 1789, some state constitutions had guarantees of protection from monopo-
lies to their citizens.42 Of course the Articles of Confederation was the first
federal Constitution, and has been viewed by many as a failure because the
powers of the "central" government were too weak.43 One of the main rea-
sons that the Articles of Confederation called for limited powers for the cen-
tral government was that at the time it was well known that a strong central
to specify that they applied to the colonies in order for the courts to find that
they did so." Calabresi, supra note 7, at 24.
39. "[T]he efforts of the English government, backed by English merchants and
manufacturers, to deny to the Americans the right to compete in foreign mar-
kets and to secure the benefits of foreign competition was one of the most
potent causes of the American Revolution." Franklin D. Jones, Historical De-
velopment of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J. 42, 49 (1926)
(quoting TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE 65 (1965)); see Cala-
bresi, supra note 7, at 28.
40. Calabresi, supra note 7, at 37.
41. Id. at 29.
42. Id. at 5.
43. See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. I.
2016] 257
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government was the greatest threat to freedom.44 The ability of a central gov-
ernment to pick winners and losers was a particularly noxious practice, espe-
cially when those selected for monopolies were not selected based on
innovation but rather a willingness to cough up pecuniary emoluments to
government. During the mid-nineteenth century, although there were some
initial false steps, antipathy towards monopolies eventually led to state devel-
opment of general corporate law that was not a grant to special interests and
in general, was the opposite of special grants of monopoly-like privileges.45
As is well known, Article I, section 8, clause 8, of the U.S. Constitution
gives Congress the right "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."46 Again based on antipathy to
governmentally generated monopolies, political leaders from a number of
states balked at giving the U.S. federal government that power. Thomas Jef-
ferson in particular viewed monopolies with disdain and recommended that
along with the other protections against government, such as freedom of re-
ligion and the press, there should be a restriction against monopolies.47 The
Patent Clause was inserted into the Constitution to gain the approval of poli-
ticians from key states as a compromise, but it was clear that the federal
government was not given the power to grant naked monopolies that did not
expand the public domain.48 To obtain a patent, the inventor had to expand
the public domain and the period of exclusivity was limited in time.49 Look-
ing ahead, it seems clear that patenting extant practices of professions does
not expand the public domain.
The sentiment against government grants of monopoly was so strong
that Jefferson opposed creation of a federal Post Office.50 The current slow
twisting in the wind of the modern-day U.S. Post Office is perhaps a hollow
vindication of the perspicacity of Jefferson's anti-monopoly inclinations. At
44. See Calabresi, supra note 7, at 35.
45. See id. at 90.
46. U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
47. Calabresi, supra note 7, at 30. Of course, Thomas Jefferson was an accom-
plished inventor himself. His opposition to monopolies is another testament to
his statesmanship.
48. See U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. According to Madison, "With regard to Monopolies, they are justly classed
among the greatest nuisances in Government. But it is clear that as encourage-
ments to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to
be wholly renounced? Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a right to the
public to abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in the grant of it?"
BERNARD SCHWARTz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
614-18 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788)), cited in Calabresi, supra note 7, at 31.
50. Calabresi, supra note 7, at 32.
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the time of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, six states held out for ban-
ning the government from enacting monopolies or wanted anti-monopoly
provisions included in the Bill of Rights.51 Typical was a recommendation
from Massachusetts, which proposed "[t]hat Congress erect no company with
exclusive advantages of commerce."52 Anti-monopoly sentiment also seeped
into the discussion of the constitutionality of a national bank.53 In the end,
however, only North Carolina banned monopolies in its own state constitu-
tion and this ban was overruled by the Supremacy Clause.54
Ultimately, framers of the federal Constitution allowed for grants of mo-
nopoly to reward authors and inventors in both the Articles of Confederation
and the U.S. Constitution. Still, the forces of crony capitalism were and are
irrepressible and continue to infect governments, state and federal, which of
course inspired counter actions. A source of continuing rancor was alleged
discrimination by the legislatures and courts of one state against out-of-state
residents and travelers from other states. In Corfield v. Coryell, the harvest-
ing of oysters and clams by non-residents of New Jersey led to a constitu-
tional challenge of the state law.55 Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward of 1819 established the principle that the Contracts Clause of the
U.S. Constitution prevented states from altering corporate charters so as to
award monopolies to corporations.56 Calabresi and Price contend that the
U.S. economy "really took off' during the nineteenth century once the rights
of shareholders were established under state law and freed from the machina-
tions of crony capitalists.57 Again, it became apparent to liberal social think-
ers of the time that most of the citizenry benefitted from a laissez-faire
economic policy and that crony capitalism was to be combated.
Not only were state legislatures and Congress oriented toward laissez-
faire policies but these attitudes permeated court opinions, including Su-
preme Court opinions under Chief Justice Roger Taney, a Jacksonian Demo-
crat.58 According to Calabresi and Price, "Jacksonians, like Chief Justice
Taney, were ardently opposed to government grants of monopoly and special
privileges to the powerful and wealthy-a phenomenon that Americans to-




55. Id. at 38.
56. Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 518 (1819).
57. Calabresi, supra note 7, at 40. Although it is a much debated issue, allowing
limited liability to shareholders for legal liabilities of corporations was legal
innovation that resulted in enormous expansion of the U.S. economy. Prior to
1837, obtaining a corporate grant was basically a grant of monopoly.
58. Id. at 41.
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day call 'Crony Capitalism."'59 Further, Calabresi and Price, quoting the Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals, indicated that "monopoly is very ingenious in
extending its rights and enlarging its pretentions."60 In the mid-nineteenth
century, in addition to slavery, government sponsored monopolies were at
the center of the most important political controversies. President Jackson's
well-known antipathy towards creation of the National Bank of the United
States was broad and comprehensive.61 The federal postal monopoly was the
target of Lysander Spooner, political reformer and abolitionist, who founded
a rival letter carrying company to challenge the U.S. Post Office.62
Calabresi and Price contend at some length that slavery was a form of
crony capitalism. 63 From virtually any perspective, slavery fails to meet any
conceivable ethical standard and so does crony capitalism, but perhaps not so
dramatically as slavery. In order to establish and maintain the privileges of
crony capitalism, exponents must seek and protect governmental rents, often
through lobbying. The arguments are often made more convincing (at least to
their audience) when combined with campaign contributions and outright
bribes. It is not farfetched to say that establishing governmental privileges
and insulation from competition is a dirty business, which was in the minds
of many who study such issues, a close relative of preserving the caste sys-
tem called slavery in the mid-nineteenth century.
Following the Civil War, a number of southern states tried to establish
the infamous "Black Codes," which were countered by proponents of the
Fourteenth Amendment, with its Equal Pr6tection Clause.64 President An-
drew Johnson, who had to deal with the Black Codes following the Civil
War, stated the Black Codes were odious because "there is no room for fa-
vored classes or monopolies, in the principle of our Government [which] is
that of equal laws . . . ."65 Again, according to Calabresi and Price, "the
Fourteenth Amendment is a ban not only of racially discriminatory laws, but
also of class based legislation and certainly of any legislation that set up a
system of caste or monopoly."66 The Slaughter-House cases in 1873 provide
a clear example of the evils of government established naked monopolies that
benefit a small group at the expense of the general public.67 Counsel for the
butchers who were challenging the constitutionality of a state statute that
59. Id. at 42. Of course, Chief Justice Taney was the author of the infamous Dred
Scott decision.
60. Id. at 43.
61. Id. at 47. "Jackson's hatred of banks was not unique to him, however."
62. Id. at 48.
63. Calabresi, supra note 7, at 54-57.
64. Id. at 58-59.
65. Id. at 61.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 62.
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granted a twenty-five year slaughterhouse monopoly to a private company
claimed that this monopoly was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.68
Counsel for the butchers went on to contend that the "English creation of
monopolies had helped to give rise to the American Revolution . . . and it
was from a country which had been thus oppressed by monopolies that our
ancestors came."69 Other examples could be cited, but it is clear that crony
capitalism emerges in a variety of industries and formats. But a consistent
theme in crony capitalism is that it often employs unethical means to obtain
and maintain governmental privileges, and those involved in such lobbying
are involved in a project that enriches the few at the expense of many.
III. CRONY CAPITALISM AND PATENT LAW
A. Business Method Patents
Business method patents can be seen as yet another manifestation of
crony capitalism that relies on the state to provide an essential barrier to
entry. We view attempts to patent portions of professions within the field of
business method patents as yet another emergence of crony capitalism that
enriches the few at the expense of many.70 As our aforementioned historical
analysis demonstrates, business method competition has occurred for centu-
ries among businesses without the need for patent protection.71 Because some
business method patents may expand the public domain, we are not confident
recommending elimination of all such patents.72 However, we are confident
in our assessment that allowing business method patents that carve out por-
tions of various professions will decrease social welfare with no offsetting
redeeming social value.73
In order to understand the present situation concerning business method
patents, one must first understand the history that led to their existence. Rec-
ognition of the need for patent law is longstanding and actually predates the
United States government. The power of the federal government to enact
legislation to protect inventors is enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, and Congress passed the first Patent Act in 1790.74 As we have
discussed above, fundamentally, a patent is a right granted by the federal
government to an inventor enabling him or her to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, selling, or importing the invention within the United States with-
68. Id.
69. Calabresi, supra note 7, at 62.
70. Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and
Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 836-75 (2003).
71. Id. at 895.
72. Id. at 897.
73. Id. at 824.
74. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109.
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out the inventor's consent.75 Patents are filed with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and generally last for a term of twenty years from the date
of filing.76
For an invention to receive patent protection it must be novel, useful,
and nonobvious.77 In other words, to receive a patent, the patentee must add
to the public domain by inventing something new that is useful and non-
obvious to those skilled in the industry. Once a patent is granted, a patent
holder may seek injunctive relief and monetary damages against an infring-
ing party.78 Monetary damages consist of either the patentee's lost profits or
royalty-based damages on sales made by the infringer that would not have
been made by patentee. 79 Additionally, the court has discretion to award up
to three times the amount of actual damages if the infringement is determined
to be willful.80
Throughout the last two centuries there has been significant litigation
over the issue of what is considered patentable subject matter. In the past
thirty years, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC) have issued a number of opinions that have fundamentally
expanded the scope of patentable subject matter.8' Before 1981, inventions
that made use of software were routinely denied patents in Supreme Court
decisions.82 But beginning with the landmark decision Diamond v. Diehr in
1981, the Supreme Court issued a series of rulings that have effectively ex-
panded the scope of patentable subject matter.83
A particularly contentious expansion of patentable subject matter oc-
curred in an area that has often been referred to as business method software
patents. In Diamond, the Supreme Court maintained that a patent should not
be issued for computer software that merely solves an equation or algorithm,
but when additional steps exist that integrate the algorithm into a particular
75. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
76. Id. § 154(a)(2).
77. Id. § 101.
78. Id. §§ 283-84.
79. Victims of patent infringement are also able to sue for reduced prices their
products are able to fetch given competition by the infringer. Id.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952).
81. Recent opinions and articles (including the instant article) suggest the pendu-
lum is cutting back on the scope of patentable subject matter. See Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
82. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 63 (1972).
83. In Diamond v. Diehr, the inventors make use of the Arrhenius equation and
computer software to regulate temperature in rubber making. Diehr, 450 U.S.
at 175.
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process, the invention may be patentable.84 In Diamond, the invention was
software controlled ovens used in making rubber.85 Since Diamond, patent
law has evolved such that the use of software or mathematical algorithms are
no longer fatal flaws. The evolution of patent law continued in the 1998 State
Street case, when the CAFC ruled that the transformation of data through
computer software that produces "a useful, concrete and tangible result" is a
process that is potentially eligible to be patented.86 In State Street, the paten-
tee owned software that solved various value, cost, and tax issues in connec-
tion with a hub and spoke mutual fund.87 According to the court, "[t]his
investment configuration provides the administrator of a mutual fund with
the advantageous combination of economies of scale in administering invest-
ments coupled with the tax advantages of a partnership."88
In the long history of patent litigation, there were attempts by some
business leaders to patent business methods or processes, but prior to the
twenty-first century, those efforts were universally unsuccessful. In 1972, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that computer software that involved the transfor-
mation of data represented an abstract idea and was, thus, unpatentable.89
Similarly, in 1978, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holding regarding
the patentability of business methods and processes and held that a mathe-
matical algorithm was not patentable, as its application was not novel.90
Shortly before its State Street decision in 1972, the Supreme Court became
increasingly open to the approval of patents for business methods and
processes-some of which involved software.91 By the early 1980s, however,
software that was (1) coupled with a particular machine92; or (2) used to
transform a particular article to a different state or substance, could be patent-
able. 93 In Diehr, the inventor sought to patent software that made use of a
famous mathematical equation to regulate the opening and closing of ovens
84. Id. at 188.
85. Id.
86. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1370.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-73 (1972).
90. Parker v. Flook, 473 U.S. 584, 594-96 (1978).
91. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d at 1373-76.
92. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981). The holding in this case repre-
sents the origin of the "machine or transformation" test. Furthermore, in Bilski,
the Supreme Court held that the "machine or transformation" test was an "im-
portant clue" towards patentability of BMPs but was not the sole test. Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010). The Supreme Court held that in the Infor-
mation Age there could be BMPs that were patentable even though they did not
satisfy the "machine or transformation test." Id.
93. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1980).
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to reduce waste in the rubber making process. 94 In approving this patent ap-
plication, the Supreme Court made clear that the inventor was not claiming
exclusive use of the Arrhenius equation.95 Diehr stands for the proposition
that software can be a component of a patentable invention, assuming that it
is tied to a particular machine.96 Further, in Chakrabarty the patentee in-
vented genetically modified bacterium that was useful in curbing the detri-
mental environmental effects of oil spills.97 In this case, the phrase, "anything
under the sun that is made by man" was used to describe what is patentable,
with the exception of laws of nature, abstract ideas, and naturally occurring
compositions of matter.98 Perhaps the expansive language used in
Chakrabarty paved the way for the State Street decision.
In Bilski, the U.S. Supreme Court grappled with the issue of patentable
subject matter in connection with a patent application for a method of hedg-
ing losses in one segment of the energy industry.99 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court struck down the application on the ground that the inventor claimed an
abstract idea as patentable subject matter, a standard that had been endorsed
by the Court in numerous decisions. The long-awaited Bilski decision, how-
ever, had much broader implications. The majority opinion, along with two
concurring opinions, rejected the criteria for patentability elucidated in State
Street by the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit, which was specifically
that a process was patentable if it produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible
result."oo The State Street decision launched a highly controversial category
of patents, i.e., business method patents.
However, the Supreme Court justices who authored opinions in Bilski
opposed limiting the subject matter of patentable processes to the "machine
or transformation test."10o Specifically, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
concludes with an invitation to the Federal Circuit and other courts to fashion
a criteria for patentable subject matter that (1) does not foreclose "Informa-
tion Age" innovations that may not satisfy the "machine or transformation"
criteria; and (2) denies patentability to inventions that merely produce a "use-
ful, concrete and tangible result."102
We recognize the wisdom of the Supreme Court justices in Bilski who
refused to draw a red line that would effectively restrict the issuance of pat-
ents for business method processes to those that could fit in the "machine or
94. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175.
95. Id. at 192-93.
96. Id.
97. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
98. Id. at 309.
99. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609-12.
100. Id. at 612.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 612-13.
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transformation" criteria. Clearly, there are Information Age patents, mainly
based on software configurations such as search engine software, that are not
tied to a particular machine and do not transform something physical into a
new state. 103 We contend, however, that there are categories of business
method patents that should be ineligible as patentable subject matter but
would not foreclose Information Age innovation.
B. Patents that Overlap with Professions
In two fairly recent, significant BMP cases, intrusion into professions
was at issue. In Comiskey the appellant appealed a decision of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences affirming the examiner's rejection of his
patent application.104 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected
the appeal based on its determination that Comiskey was attempting to patent
unpatentable subject matter. Claim 17 in the patent application No. 09/
461,742 recites a "system for mandatory arbitration resolution regarding one
or more unilateral documents."105 Essentially, Comiskey was trying to patent
an electronic version of a mandatory dispute resolution procedure, which in-
cluded agreement to be bound to the decision of an arbitrator as well as a
procedure for selecting the arbitrator.106 In addition to being non-patentable
because the invention is obvious, the USPTO requested that the Federal Cir-
cuit rule on whether the appellant's application claimed patentable subject
matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act.107
For the practice of law, composing mandatory arbitration procedures is
a routine operating procedure, designed to resolve disputes without appearing
before a court, which is generally much more expensive. The only innovation
associated with the Comiskey patent application is that the procedure was
electronic, or software based. Again, if this patent was issued, it would not
expand the public domain but rather could create needless disputes between
the patentee and lawyers practicing their profession.108 In its decision, the
Federal Circuit indicated that Comiskey's patent application fell into the cat-
egory of "business method" patents.1 09 In discussing patentable subject mat-
ter, the Federal Circuit cited the Supreme Court as stating that the
constitutional limitation on patentability "was written against the backdrop of
the [English] practices-eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies-
103. Amazon has contended that its search engine is powered by several software
patents, including the famous "one-click" patent. Amazon.com v.
BamesandNoble.com, 239 F.3d 1343, 1357-59, (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in good or businesses
which had long before been enjoyed by the public."o In other words, the
danger of crony capitalism was still relevant in 2009.
The Federal Circuit noted that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries the English Crown granted monopolies over entire types of business to
specific individuals, for example the grant by James I to Darcy in 1600 of the
exclusive right to manufacture or sell playing cards. "The purpose of such
monopolies 'was to enrich the King . .. as well as the grantee, at the expense
of the community."'II Again, this is a variation on the theme of this paper,
namely that granting monopolies is a manifestation of crony capitalism, ex-
cept when the recipient invents something that expands the public domain by
creating something that is "new and useful art."11 2 In modem terms, a "useful
art" is a process, and the 1952 Patent Act changed the word from "useful art"
to the word "process."113 Relying on the Supreme Court decisions, the Fed-
eral Circuit Court contended that abstract ideas are not patentable subject
matter unless tied to a particular machine or transformed something physi-
cal.114 According to the Federal Circuit:
It is clear that the present statute does not allow patents to be
issued on particular business systems-such as a particular type of
arbitration-that depend entirely on the use of mental processes.
In other words, the patent statute does not allow patents on partic-
ular systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence
alone, a field of endeavor that both the framers and Congress in-
tended to be beyond the reach of patentable subject matter.115
In short, an electronic procedure for doing what is common in a profession is
not patentable subject matter.
Another significant business method patent case was reported in Bilski
v. Kappos in 2010.116 The applicant in Bilski was trying to patent a method of
hedging in the energy industry, which the Supreme Court ultimately held was
an abstract idea and thus unpatentable subject matter.1 7 In reaching its con-
clusion that this method of hedging against the risk of price fluctuations was
unpatentable, the U.S. Supreme Court held, consistent with prior rulings, an
110. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 889 (1971).
111. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 976 (quoting PETER MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS,
PATENTS, AND MONOPOLY 31 (2d ed. 1950)).
112. Id. at 977.
113. Id. at 980.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 597-98 (2010).
117. Id. at 611-12.
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idea standing alone is not patentable.'1 8 Patentable subject matter is an inven-
tion that is a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter ac-
cording to Section 101 of the Patent Act. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court rejected the "machine or transformation" test as the sole criteria as to
whether a process is patentable.119 The Supreme Court explicitly validates the
patentability of business methods.120 Under Bilski, BMPs are valid so long as
they are not simply an abstract idea, law of nature, or physical phenomena. 121
The bottom line is that patents are reserved for inventions that expand the
public domain and are not available to those who use their minds to create a
great idea, solve an equation, or discover a law of nature.
In Bilski, the Supreme Court does discuss and affirm a defense to a
claim of patent infringement based on prior use as defined in Section
273(b)(1).122 Section 273 is based on a recent amendment to the Patent Act
that was enacted to protect business owners who created business methods
but chose not to apply for a patent. In effect, if a business owner chose to
protect a business method through trade secret law, a subsequent patentee
inventing the same business method could generate liability for the original
inventor of the business method. On the other hand, a patent applicant of that
method would not normally know of the prior use because it was protected
by the requirements of trade secret law. In effect, allowing the prior use de-
fense for business methods cancels out the public domain consequences.
IV. THE LEARNED PROFESSION DEFENSE
Increasingly, the boundary between professions and patents has been
blurred and there is a need for clarification. Further, providing a conceptual
barrier between transactions subject to professional codes of ethics and those
eligible to be patented would provide guidance to professionals. We view the
continued growth of professions, broadly defined, as not an accident.123 In
terms of societal welfare, we contend that some business method patents
more closely resemble some of the worst abuses of crony capitalism.
As will be discussed below, there are social welfare safeguards for
transactions that are part of professions. To allow professions to be carved up
118. Id.
119. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
120. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 594 (2010).
121. Id. at 309.
122. Id. at 607 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012)).
123. A recent article published by the Brookings Institute estimated that as much as
thirty percent of the workforce in the United States is a member of some pro-
fession or professional group. Brad Hershbein et al., Nearly 30 Percent of
Workers in the U.S. Need a License to Perform Their Job: It Is Time to Ex-
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by patent law inventors will: (1) raise the cost of doing business as a profes-
sional; and (2) not be offset by any redeeming merit. Business method pat-
ents that overlap with a profession seem to be on particularly shaky ground
because there are safeguards provided by grants of authority from states to
professions that make it easier to prosecute unethical business practices. Fur-
thermore, codes of professional ethics that have created artificial and unwar-
ranted barriers to competition have been recognized by authorities and
largely curbed.124
In order to adequately address the impact of business method patents on
professionals, it is first necessary to understand what is meant by the term
"profession." Ultimately, we contend that being in a profession provides
some safety for the public and thus patents should not be awarded to business
method "inventions" that claim transactions traditionally associated with the
practice of a profession. On the other hand, we are very cognizant that pro-
fessional licensing requirements also are capable of manipulation that could
harm the public, and there is a rich history of anti-competitive professional
licensing requirements.125
Although there is no universal agreement as to the definition of a pro-
fession, Kritzer makes a distinction between three different definitions of a
profession: the lay, historical, and sociological.126 The lay definition is very
broad and is generally used to make a distinction from an amateur; it is used
to describe almost any means of livelihood as long as they are committed to a
set of standards of performance.127 The historical definition focuses upon
trained expertise and selection by merit.128 This view corresponds with the
dictionary definition: Webster's New World Dictiohary defines a profession
as a "vocation or occupation requiring advanced education and training, in-
volving intellectual skills, as medicine, law, theology, engineering, teaching,
124. Both the courts and law makers have been persuaded provisions within profes-
sional codes that are anti-competitive, such as lack of reciprocity and price-
fixing, have been largely corrected and abolished. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975). More recently in NC. State Bd. of
Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the
Supreme Court found that rules of professional associations are sometimes
anti-competitive. N.C. State Bd. Of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 717 F.3d 359,
374-75 (2015). Note that David Baumer was an expert witness in the Dental
Examiners litigation.
125. Most of the worst abuses of professional licensing requirements involved price
fixing, usually in the form of setting minimum prices, and lack of reciprocity
with licensing boards from other states.
126. H.M. Kritzer, The Professions are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal
Practice in a Postprofessional World, L. Soc. REv. 713, 716 (1999).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 716-17.
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etc."129 Neither of these two views establishes a precise enough definition for
our purposes.
The sociological definition takes the perspective of the various stages of
economic development. Pursuant to this view, societies become more com-
plex over time, and this social evolution is the adaptive upgrading of the
social system to its environment.130 Society is held together via the genera-
lized acceptance of particular values. Within society, professions occupy a
key position; they are the major bearers and transmitters of rational values
and also of new technological knowledge which propels the economy for-
ward.1 3 1 Thus, it is argued that the emergence of professional occupational
groups is a defining feature of modern society.132 Given the importance of
professions in leading society and its evolutionary development, protection
of their ability to practice their skills should be paramount.
Sociologists enumerate various attributes in their attempt to define what
it means to be a profession. A summary of several attributes posited by nu-
merous authors is contained in the chart below:.
TABLE ONE
Kritzerl33 Millerson34 Barberl35 Goodel36
Application of Skills based on High degree of
abstract theoretical generalized and
knowledge knowledge systematic
knowledge







129. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY: SECOND COLLEGE EDITION (2d ed.
1.979); see also BRIAN P. WEST, PROFESSIONALISM AND ACCOUNTING RULES
(2003).
130. TALco'rr PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34-35 (Rev. ed. 1954).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Kritzer, supra note 126, at 717.
134. GEOFFREY MILLERSON, THE QUALIFYING ASSOCIATIONS (1964).
135. Bernard Barber, Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions, 92
DAEDALUS 669, 672 (1963).
136. William J. Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 22 AM.
Soc. REV. 194, 194 (1957).
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Code of conduct Code of ethics sharing common
values
Altruism Service for the Primary Clear social
common good orientation to limits
the community established
Recognized Professional Community has










Autonomy via Role defined by
peer-review and member and
clients nonmembers
Summarizing the most significant features above, a profession can be
understood as a recognized community that 1) possesses and applies a
particular type of knowledge; 2) is learned via a process of education and
training; and that community creates a code of conduct that espouses
common values in order to provide service that benefits the common good.137
Additionally, in many professions, there is a fiduciary relationship between
professionals and their clients, which assumes that professionals will place
interests of clients above their own, unlike most third party transactions in
which, within limits, each party is not required to look out for the interests of
the other party. Ethical codes are glue that bind the five features of a
profession together with a fiduciary relationship between individual
professionals and their clients.
Abbott's understanding of a profession is that of an "exclusive
occupational group[ ] applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular
cases."138 Combining these characteristics with their abstract knowledge-
based expertise has enabled professions to generally assert claims of
independence that other occupational groups have been generally
137. Some go further, noting that the definition of a profession is based on two
primary factors: a prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract
knowledge, and a collectivity or service orientation.
138. ANDREw ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DivISION
OF EXPERT LABOR 8 (1988).
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unsuccessful at advancing.139 As a result, professions "enjoy largely
unchallenged authority in connection with the technical aspects of the
services they deliver . . . ."140 "Professions are characterized by an elevated
occupational authority, typically involving an exclusive and state-sponsored
mandate to provide certain services and define the nature of those services
. . ."141 Combining these norms with the organizational system leaves us
with a largely autonomous, self-regulating, and self-perpetuating association
institution, within which altruistic members are filled with a desire to work
for the common good in the most effective way; no external control is
required.142 Additionally, professions are connected to a reward system of
society, sometimes making them highly rewarded, materially as well as with
status and prestige.143
These attributes of a profession create a spectrum of professionalism, in
which the extent to which it is present in different forms of occupational
performance can be measured.144 Thus, the definition of "profession" is
malleable, and as a community that possesses a greater number and
magnitude of attributes, they become more "professional." All occupational
behavior has some degree of knowledge as one of its attributes. The "learned
professions" signify that a high degree of generalized and systematic
knowledge became one of the commonly used defining characteristics of
professional behavior.145 By contrast, it is this critical attribute of professions
that BMP patents cordon off and limit the ability of professionals to share
and utilize their collective body of knowledge.146
In fact, Congress has already intervened in the medical services sector
and declared that patent infringement lawsuits against medical practitioners
139. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 136 (1977).
140. WEST, supra note 129, at 129.
141. Id. at 64.
142. Brante, Sociological Approaches to the Professions, 31 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA
119, 122 (1988). Certainly there have been instances in which professions
favor expansion of their domain at the expense of the public. At one time, price
fixing, which is illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, among members of
the bar was common.
143. Id. at 123.
144. Barber, supra note 135, at 673.
145. .Id. at 672.
146. Scientific professionals are noted to have their own specific norm system-
CUDOs: Communism, Universalism, Disinterestedness, and Organized
Skepticism. See Robert K. Merton, The Institutional Imperatives of Science, in
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: SELECTIVE READINGS (Barry Barnes ed., 1972).
Communism is especially important as it denotes the concept of no private
ownership existing in scientific communities as scientific results are common
goods.
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for practicing their profession are unenforceable.147 Historically, patents on
medical procedures were rarely granted or enforced in the United States.148
However, by 1996 as many as fifteen medical procedures were patented
every week.14 9 This resulted in the leaders of the medical profession
successfully approaching Congress to restrict enforcement of patents on
medical procedures, on the basis that they threatened innovation.150
The response of the medical profession may serve as a good pre-
dictor of the reaction of other professions that are newcomers to
the patent system . . . . Whether business and other professionals
will, like physicians, possess the wherewithal to persuade Con-
gress to create particularized patent-free spheres of activity re-
mains to be seen. Few occupations are as well-organized, imbued
with a sense of profession and capable of employing the rhetoric
of public service as the practice of medicine.151
The approach taken by the Physicians' Immunity Statute in 1996 was
intended to shrink liability by barring patent holders from obtaining damages
or injunctions against medical practitioners for infringing patents on medical
procedures.1 52 But this approach has several notable limitations. First, it
raises questions regarding compliance with the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Second, the statute has a narrow
reach, due to its: (1) failure to protect processes if they also involve patented
drugs, devices, or products; and (2) prospective nature, covering only patents
issued after the date of enactment. Finally, determination of the application
of the immunity provision is a question of fact that often cannot be resolved
on summary judgment; thus, it does not protect the practitioner from all of
the costs associated with preparing a full defense.153 The aforementioned lim-
itations associated with the Physicians Immunity Statute support an alterna-
tive to the limited liability approach in order to adequately protect
professionals.
There should be another defense when a business method patent inter-
feres with professional practices, especially the practice of accounting. If the
"invention" does not expand the public domain but instead overlaps with the
147. Patent Act of 1952 § 287 (c).
148. Brian McCormick, Just Reward or Just Plain Wrong? Specter of Royalties
From Method Patents Stirs Debate, 37 AM. MEDICAL NEWS 33 (1994).
149. Wendy W. Yang, Patent Policy and Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for
Statutory Exclusion From Patentability, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 5 (1995).
150. Sabra Chartrand, Why is This Surgeon Suing?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at
Dl.
151. Thomas, supra note 1, at 1177.
152. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2001).
153. Ellen P. Aprill, The Supreme Court's Opinions in Bilski and the Future of Tax
Strategy Patents, 113(2) J. OF TAXATION 81, 81-93 (2010).
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practices of an existing profession, the rationale for issuing such patents
evaporates. We are proposing a "Learned Profession" defense for claims of
patentees that intrude on professional practices. Such a defense is consistent
with the defense available to medical providers who are sued by a patentee
who claims that the practice of medicine violates his or her patent. The fact
that many of these BMPs that carve out professional practices are electronic
should not matter.
Being in a profession can be considered as having a "license to experi-
ment"-and the post-State Street trend in business method patents runs
counter to this notion. There should be a clear delineation between develop-
ment of intellectual skills known by those in a profession and inventions of a
new process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. Professional
development of intellectual skills and mental steps is an ordinary part of be-
ing a.professional-not an invention that qualifies as patentable subject mat-
ter. The recent attempts to patent various business methods that overlap with
professions are just another form of crony capitalism. When professionals are
threatened in their professional practices by patentees who possess business
method patents, the cost of doing business goes up and the public domain
shrinks rather than expanding.
V. CONCLUSION
We believe that the rationale for the Statute of Monopolies is still viable
and directly relates to business method patents in the twenty-first century.
We contend that any process that overlaps standard practices of professions
should not qualify as a patentable process because there is no expansion of
the public domain. Such patents are simply an appropriation of material that
is part of a professional practice, in effect a zero sum contest between alleged
inventors and professionals, but probably a negative sum contest once trans-
actions and litigation costs are calculated. In general, professions are licensed
and reserved by government, often state governments, to those that meet
minimum standards in terms of education, training, and adherence to profes-
sional ethics or codes. Professions are self-regulated in the sense that they
establish their own standards for minimum education and training and re-
serve the right to take away licenses from practitioners who prove to be un-
trustworthy or unethical in the eyes of fellow professionals. The authors
contend that there is a fundamental distinction between a patentable inven-
tion and professional innovation. Where a patent lays claim to transactions
traditionally associated with the practice of a profession, there is no net in-
crease in the public domain, but it is another manifestation of the use of
government to create barriers to entry, or crony capitalism.
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